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Abstract
吀�is paper focuses on sentences likeNixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too, ﬁrst discussed by
Soames (1982) and Karttunen and Peters (1979), which raise three problems. First, they are
felicitous and do not appear to have presuppositions. However all major theories of presup-
positions predict that they should presuppose what the antecedent presupposes (e.g., the sen-
tence above should presuppose thatNixon is guilty). Second, there is a contrast between these
sentences and the corresponding sentence-initial conditionals like if Haldeman is guilty too,
Nixon is guilty. Finally, a way to solve the problem would be to locally accommodate the pre-
supposition in the antecedent. However, this wrongly predicts tautological truth-conditions.
In the case above, the predicted meaning could be paraphrased as “Nixon is guilty, if both
Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.” As a solution to these three problems, I propose that the
presupposition is nonetheless locally accommodated in the antecedent and furthermore that
the sentence is also interpreted exhaustively, which gives rise to a non-presuppositional and
non-tautological meaning analogous toNixon is guilty, only if both Haldeman and Nixon are
guilty. Furthermore, I argue that the degraded status of the sentence-initial case is an indepen-
dent fact rooted in the topic-focus structure of sentence-ﬁnal conditionals. Finally, the present
proposal can also be extended to treat related non-presuppositional cases like I will go, if we go
together.
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1. Introduction
1.1.吀�e Problem in Brief
Cases like (1), (2), and (3) are problematic for all major theories of presupposi-
tion projection.1
(1) Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too. (Soames, 1982)
(2) I’ll go to the party, if you go too.
(3) Mary is in the oﬃce, if John is there too.
吀�e recipe for these problematic examples is simple: create a sentence-ﬁnal con-
ditional with “too” in the antecedent and its presupposition as the consequent.
吀�ere are three problems with these cases. 吀�e ﬁrst one, which I call “the pre-
supposition problem,” concerns the fact that (1)–(3) are felicitous and appear
presuppositionless. Nonetheless, the prediction for all theories above is that they
should presuppose that Nixon is guilty, that I’ll go to the party, and that Mary
is in the oﬃce, respectively.2吀�e second problem, “the contrast problem,” has to
do with the fact that there appears to be a contrast between (1)–(3) on one hand
and (4)–(6) on the other.
(4) ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty. (Soames, 1982)
(5) ?If you’ll go to the party too, I will go.
(6) ?If John is in the oﬃce too, Mary is there.
吀�e third problem, “the truth-conditions problem,” concerns the fact that a typi-
cal way of solving the presupposition problemwould be local accommodation of
the presupposition in the antecedent of the conditional. However, this predicts
tautological truth-conditions for cases like (1)–(3); the meanings obtained are
(7)–(9).
1) See Heim (1983); Beaver (2001); Beaver and Krahmer (2001); Schlenker (2008, 2009);
George (2008); Rothschild (2011).
2) Notice that one might think that the interpretation of (1) could be one in which we are
presupposing that somebody else in the context is guilty (not Nixon). As Kripke (2009) has
observed, we are not generally able to do this (cf. fn. 27). Furthermore, we can exclude this
reading explicitly as in (i).
(i) I don’t know whether anybody is guilty, but Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
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(7) Nixon is guilty, if both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
(8) I will go to the party, if you and I go to the party.
(9) Mary is in the oﬃce, if Mary and John are in the oﬃce.
1.2.吀�e Proposal in Brief
As a solution to the presupposition problem, I propose that the presupposition is
nonetheless locally accommodated in the antecedent. As we just saw, the imme-
diate challenge is that thismove gives rise to the tautologicalmeanings in (7)–(9).
In response to this second issue, I argue that cases like (1)–(3) are exhaustiﬁed
conditionals, in the sense of Chierchia et al. (to appear), with a meaning analo-
gous to (10)–(12).3
(10) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
(11) I’ll go to the party, only if you go too.
(12) Mary is in the oﬃce, only if John is there too.
As I show below, this proposal provides, among other things, a uniﬁed account
of (1)–(3) and (10)–(12), the presuppositionless status of which is also prob-
lematic for many of the theories mentioned above. Furthermore, given that if-
conditionals in general are not interpreted as only-if conditionals, I have to
address below what mechanisms are responsible for the reinterpretation in the
cases I’m focusing on. Finally, as a solution to the contrast problem, I submit
that the slightly degraded status of (4)–(6) is an independent fact rooted in the
relation between topic-focus structure and the position of the if-clause. Before
turning to the proposal, I show in more detail that the presupposition problem
is a real problem for all accounts above.4But ﬁrst, let us brieﬂy look at the frame-
work that I adopt.
3) 吀�anks to Irene Heim (pc) for suggesting this strategy.
4) Karttunen and Peters (1979: fn. 17) suggest an account of cases like (1) in terms of too
taking scope over the entire conditional.While this might be reasonable when too is located at
the right edge of the sentence, it is unclear how one could generalize this idea to cases of also
like (i), which appears in the sameway felicitous (thanks toYasutada Sudo (p.c.) for discussion
on this data).
(i) I’ll go to the party, if you also go.
See also Kripke (2009) and Soames (2009) for discussion of these cases.
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2. Adopting a Trivalent Framework
2.1. ANote on the Choice
I adopt a trivalent theory of presupposition projection..
two periods correct?
5 While nothing hinges
on this choice, I use it because the trivalent theory is generally known and has
been revived as one of the serious contenders in the recent literature. Fur-
thermore, like other recent theories of presupposition projection, it separates
clearly a basic system, which predicts symmetric projection of presupposi-
tions and an independentmechanism for predicting asymmetric patterns of pro-
jection.6吀�is is convenient for our purposes because it provides a way to present
the predictions of diﬀerent mechanisms for creating the asymmetry. In particu-
lar, there are two types of approaches for making the system asymmetric: a linear
order based approach and a hierarchical order based approach.7
Sentence-ﬁnal conditionals are relevant for this debate, since they are some
of the few cases in which the two approaches make divergent predictions (see
Schlenker, 2008; Chierchia, 2010). One might think that Soames’ cases can
be solved by one or the other approach. In particular the contrast between the
sentence-ﬁnal (1) and a sentence-initial (4), repeated below in (13-a) and (13-b),
might suggest that a linear order based approach can fare better here.
(13) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty.
吀�e trivalent theory provides a convenient way to illustrate that this is not the
case: whether we combine it with a linear or hierarchical order we make no
headway on solving the problem. Furthermore, the solution I propose in the end
is neutral with respect to this debate.
2.2. Ingredients
2.2.1.吀�e吀�ird Value and Its Projection
吀�e basic logic is trivalent, hence the domain of truth-values is expanded to
include a third value, indicated as #.吀�is third value is interpreted as uncertainty
5) See Peters (1979); Beaver and Krahmer (2001); George (2008); Fox (2008); Fox (2012).
6) 吀�e reason for this separation is the fact that the recent presupposition debate started from
an attempt to explain the asymmetric part of the projection behavior of presuppositions in a
more principled way than previous approaches (see Schlenker, 2008).
7) For the former see Schlenker (2008, 2009), Fox (2008),George (2008),Rothschild (2011);
for the latter see Chierchia (2010). See also George (2008) for discussion.
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about some actual underlying truth-value of the sentence. In other words, if a
sentence φp is evaluated in a world in which its presupposition p is not met we
cannot tell whether it is true or false in that world.
(14) If for some w, p(w) = 0 then φp(w) = #
Given the way we interpret the third value, we need a principle that guides
us in deciding what to do when a complex sentence has arguments that are
non-classically valued. In other words, a principle that tells us how # projects.
吀�e principle that is generally adopted is the so called “Strong Kleene principle”,
the deﬁnition of which is in (15).
(15) Strong Kleene: If the classically-valued arguments of a connective would suﬃce to
determine a truth value in standard logic, then the sentence as a whole has that value;
otherwise it doesn’t have a classical value. (Beaver and Geurts, to appear)
吀�e principle requires us to do whatever we can with the classically valued argu-
ments. To give a concrete example, consider the case of disjunctionwith a presup-
position trigger embedded in one of the disjuncts, as schematically represented
in (16). 吀�e question to ask is how the non-classical value of φp projects to the
whole disjunction.
(16) q or φp
吀�e Strong Kleene principle tells us that undeﬁnedness projects to the whole
disjunction, only when we cannot determine a classical value just by looking at
the value of q. In other words, the predicted projection for (16) is the standard
one in (17): if q is false, then the presupposition of φpmust be true or the whole
sentence is undeﬁned.
(17) ¬q → p
吀�at this result is a goodprediction is shownby the intuitively presuppositionless
status of (18-a), which is indeed predicted to presuppose just the tautological
(18-b).
(18) a. Haldeman isn’t guilty or Nixon is guilty too. no presupposition
b. If Haldeman is guilty, Haldeman is guilty.
2.2.2. Connecting Undeﬁnedness to Presuppositions
We saw a principle that tells us about how semantic undeﬁnedness projects.吀�e
question is how to connect this notion to a more pragmatic notion of presuppo-
sition, in the sense of Stalnaker (1978). Stalnaker (1978) himself suggests a way
to do this, by proposing that utterances should express propositions that have a
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(classical) truth-value in each world of the context set. Von Fintel (2008) formu-
lates this as a felicity condition on the utterance of sentences as in (19).
(19) Stalnaker’s bridge: A sentence φ uttered in a context c is felicitous if for every world w
∈ c, φ(w) ≠ #.
(19) connects semantic undeﬁnedness andpragmatic presupposition in the sense
above, as it eﬀectively requires that the presupposition of a sentence should be
entailed by the context set in which the presupposing sentence is uttered.
One question for any account of presuppositions based on contextual satis-
faction is what happens when a condition like (19) is not met. A response to
this question from the trivalent theory is allowing a reinterpretation of the sen-
tence in a way that renders the presupposition part of the assertion. In order to
do this, we can deﬁne an assertion operator (A operator), that works as a presup-
position wipe-out tool in the system (Beaver and Krahmer, 2001). I turn to this
task now.
2.2.3.吀�e Assertion Operator
吀�e semantics of the A operator is in (20).
(20) ⟦A⟧(φ)(w)
= 1 if φ(w) = 1
= 0 if φ(w) ≠ 1
(20), together with Stalnaker’s bridge, makes adding the A operator equivalent
to asserting the presupposition; for any sentence φp, A(φp) = p ∧ φp. In a context
in which Stalnaker’s bridge is not met, we have the option of reinterpreting the
sentence with anA operator. Furthermore, theA operator is an operator that can
be merged at any scope site in the sentence, which also raises the question about
the scope position whereA is merged relative to other operators in the sentence.
Suppose a sentence like (21) is uttered in a context in which Stalnaker’s bridge is
not met.
(21) John doesn’t drive his Ferrari to school. He doesn’t want to show oﬀ.
One way to reinterpret (21) is by merging theA operator globally and obtaining
the intuitively correct meaning in (22).
(22) A[¬[John drives his Ferrari to school]] = John has a Ferrari and doesn’t drive it to
school.
Suppose instead that the same sentence is uttered in the same context but with a
diﬀerent continuation as in (23).
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(23) John doesn’t drive his Ferrari to school. He doesn’t have one.
Here globally merging the operator would create a meaning that is in contradic-
tion with the continuation. However, we also have the option of locally merging
A and obtaining themeaning in (24), which is instead compatible with John not
having aFerrari:what (24) says is that either he doesn’t have aFerrari or hedoesn’t
drive it to school.
(24) ¬[A[John drives his Ferrari to school]] = It’s not true that [ John has a Ferrari and drives
it to school]
One immediate question for accounts based on repairs like theAoperator in (20)
is what the conditions that govern its use are andwhat the conditions that govern
the choice between global and local merging are. 吀�is is a general problem and
it is completely parallel to the question about global and local accommodation
in the sense of Heim (1983). I come back to this issue in section 5.2. Now that
we have an account to work with, I will demonstrate that the presupposition
problem is really a problem.
3.吀�e Presupposition Problem Really Is a Problem
吀�e theory sketched above predicts symmetric ﬁltering of presuppositions. It
makes the same predictions for (25-a) and (25-b). It is not clear that this is a
wrong prediction in the case of disjunction, but there are arguments for asym-
metry in the literature coming from other connectives (see Rothschild, 2011,
for a critical discussion).
(25) a. Haldeman isn’t guilty or Nixon is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty too or Haldeman isn’t guilty.
Assuming that we want asymmetry, there are two main types of approaches for
making a system like the trivalent theory above asymmetric: a linear order based
approach and a hierarchical order based approach. As I show below, regardless
of which approach one chooses, the prediction is that cases like (26-a) (= 1)
should presuppose (26-b). In other words, the presupposition problem really is a
problem.
(26) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty.
3.1. Creating the Asymmetry
In the following I sketch two ways of making the trivalent theory above asym-
metric. Both of them essentially restrict the material that one may consider in
160 J. Romoli / International Review of Pragmatics 4 (2012) 153–184
2012119 [IRP-2012-4.2] 02-Romoli-proof-01 [date 1209121730 : version 1209111200] page 160
applying the Strong Kleene Principle. 吀�e diﬀerence is whether we should base
our restriction onmaterial that comes ﬁrst in terms of linear order or onmaterial
that is “lower” in a structural sense.
3.1.1. A Linear Order Based Asymmetry
I adopt (and slightly adapt) an informal principle by Beaver and Geurts (to
appear) that describes what the linear-order based approach does. Before turn-
ing to the principle, notice that another way of formulating the Strong Kleene
principle is as shown in (27).
(27) Strong Kleene (reformulation)
a. For each argument X that takes a non-classical value, check whether on the basis
of everything else in the sentence, you can determine that assigning an arbitrary
classical value to X would not have an eﬀect on the overall value.
b. If so, just assignX an arbitrary value, and carry on.Otherwise, the sentence as a whole
lacks a classical truth value.
c. If this procedure allows all non-classical values to be ﬁlled in classically, then the
sentence can be assigned a classical value.
Consider now what it means to restrict the principle above to just the material
on the le昀� in the linear order.8
(28) Linear Order:
a. Go from le昀� to right through the sentence. For each argument X that takes a non-
classical value, check whether on the basis of material on its le昀�, you can deter-
mine that an arbitrary classical value to X would not have an eﬀect on the overall
value.
b. If so, just assignX an arbitrary value, and carry on.Otherwise, the sentence as a whole
lacks a classical truth value.
c. If this procedure allows all non-classical values to be ﬁlled in classically, then the
sentence can be assigned a classical value.
To give a concrete example, consider (29), analyzed as material implication for
the sake of simplicity. Imagine also that in the evaluation world w, φp(w) = #.
(29) if p, φp
It is clear that when we hit φp we know, looking only at material on its le昀�, that
it’s not going to matter whether we assign 1 or 0 to φp(w). In fact, if φp(w) = #,
8) Sometimes this principle is called Middle Kleene, see Beaver and Geurts (to appear).
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then p(w)= 0, hence the conditional is going to be true inw nomatter what the
value of the consequent is.
3.1.2. Structure-Based Approach
To facilitate a comparison between the two approaches, we can formulate a
similar informal description of the structure-based approach.
(30) Hierarchical Order:
a. Proceed bottom up, following the semantic composition. For each function f and
argument X, if X takes a non-classical value, check:
(i) whether there is a co-argument Y of f c-commanded by X
(ii) if there is such Y, whether on the basis of it you can determine that an arbitrary
classical value to X would not have an eﬀect on the value of f(Y)(X).
b. If so, just assign X an arbitrary value, and carry on to the next f, otherwise f(Y)(X)
(or f(X)(Y)) lacks a classical truth value.
c. If this procedure allows all non-classical values to be ﬁlled in classically, then the
sentence can be assigned a classical value.
As an example consider again (31-a), and assume the structure in (31-b), where
f is a function associated with the conditional.9
(31) a. if p, φp
b.
If we consider the function f and the argument φp, there is a co-argument of f
c-commanded by φp, on the basis of which we can determine that assigning an
arbitrary value to φp is irrelevant. In fact if φp(w) = #, then p(w) = 0 and the
conditional is going to be true inwnomatterwhat the value of the consequent is.
Let’s go back now to the case is (32) (= 1), schematized as (33), and let us turn
to see that both approaches actually make the same problematic prediction.10
9) I am using material implication here, but the same result would be obtained with the
semantics of conditionals that I discuss in section 4.2.
10) Asmentioned above, these two approachesmake diﬀerent predictions in certain instances
of sentence ﬁnal conditionals (see Schlenker, 2008;Chierchia, 2010).Consider (i-a) and (i-b),
schematized as (ii-a) and (ii-b).Notice that these cases are very similar to Soames’, but crucially
the position of the sentence with “too” and its presupposition are swapped: the latter is now
in the antecedent and the former is in the consequent.
(i) a. If Haldeman is guilty, Nixon is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty too, if Haldeman is guilty.
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(32) Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
(33) p, if φp
3.2. Back to Soames’ Cases
Soames’ cases are problematic for the hierarchical order based approach because
there is no co-argument of φp c-commanded by φp on the basis of which we
could determine whether any arbitrary assignment to φp would be irrelevant.
吀�e presupposition of φp is hence wrongly predicted to project to the whole
conditional.11
(34)
吀�e linear order based approach does not fare better here. In fact, the projection
predicted for a sentence-ﬁnal conditional like (35-a) is (35-b).
(ii) a. if p, φp
b. φp, if p
吀�e linear-order based approach correctly predicts that (ii-a) should be presuppositionless. In
fact, on the basis of the material on the le昀� we can determine that giving an arbitrary value
to the consequent has no overall eﬀect on the truth-value of the whole conditional. On the
other hand, in the sentence ﬁnal case in (ii-b) there is no material on the le昀�; the linear order
approach, thus, predicts that the presupposition of φp projects to the whole disjunction. 吀�e
hierarchical order predicts no diﬀerence between the two cases. In fact the antecedent is a
co-argument of f and it is c-commanded by the consequent, regardless of the linear order, so
we can always take it into consideration.
(iii) a.
b.
11) Notice that the case of only if is also problematic for this approach because, wherever only
is merged, there is no apparent reason why it should change the relevant structural relation
between antecedent and consequent.
(i)
Furthermore only seems to let presupposition go through in general as (ii) shows.
(ii) a. Only John likes his car.
b. ↝ John has a car.
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(35) a. q, if φp
b. ¬q → p
吀�is is because if q is true in somew, we can determine that thewhole conditional
is true in that world, regardless of the value of the antecedent. 吀�is means that
the undeﬁnedness of the antecedent projects to thewhole conditional only if the
consequent is false. Applying this to Soames’ case, which has the form in (36-a),
the predicted presupposition is (36-b), which is equivalent to (36-c).
(36) a. p, if φp
b. ¬p → p
c. p
Crucially the linear order based theory does not predict the tautological p → p,
which is what we would need here to account for the presuppositionless status
of (36-a).
4.吀�e Proposal inMore Detail
4.1. Solving the Presupposition Problem: Local Accommodation
I submit that the presupposition is locally accommodated in the antecedent. In
the trivalent framework adopted here, thismeansmerging theA operator locally,
so that we interpret (37-a) and (37-b).
(37) a. p, if φp
b. p, if A(φp) = p, if (p ∧ φp)
An immediate concern for this approach is what to do about the tautological
meaning that we obtain. 吀�is is what I called “the truth-conditions problem”
above, which is the topic of the next section.
4.2. Solving the Truth Conditions Problem: Exhaustiﬁcation
I propose that cases like (38-a) are cases of exhaustiﬁed conditionals, with a
meaning analogous to (38-b).吀�emeaning we obtain is thus equivalent to (39),
which is obviously not tautological.
(38) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
(39) If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty
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吀�e question now is how to obtain this meaning compositionally. In the fol-
lowing, I show that we can do so by adopting Fintel’s (1997) semantics for “only
if ”.
4.2.1. A Semantics for “only if ”
I adopt Fintel’s (1997) theory of only if conditionals.12 Again this not essential,
but it gives me a concrete way to present and compute the predictions of the
proposal here. 吀�e ingredients of von Fintel’s (1997) account are the following:
ﬁrst, the LF for a case like (40-a) is (40-b), where gen is an implicit universal
quantiﬁer, with the semantics in (41).
(40) a.吀�e ﬂag ﬂies only if the Queen is home.
b. Onlyc [gen [if the Queen is home] [the ﬂag ﬂies]]
(41) ⟦gen⟧( f)(p)(q)(w) = ∀wʹ ∈ f(w)[p(wʹ) → q(wʹ)]
where f is a context dependent function that selects a modal base
Importantly, this semantics validates contraposition, which says that a condi-
tional if p, q is equivalent to if ¬q, ¬p.13
(42) Contraposition: ⟦gen⟧( f)(p)(q)(w) ↔ ⟦gen⟧( f)(¬q)(¬p)(w)
Furthermore, the semantics comes with two presuppositions: a compatibility
presupposition, which requires there to be antecedent worlds in the modal base
and an homogeneity presupposition, which requires that either all antecedent
worlds are consequent worlds or all antecedent worlds are not consequent
worlds.
(43) Compatibility presupposition
capitalize 'p'?
: ⟦gen⟧( f)(p)(q)(w) is deﬁned if:
∃wʹ ∈ f(w)[p(wʹ)]
(44) Homogeneity Presupposition: ⟦gen⟧( f)(p)(q)(w) is deﬁned if:
∀wʹ ∈ f(w)[p(wʹ) → q(wʹ)] ∨ ∀wʹ ∈ f(w)[p(wʹ) → ¬q(wʹ)]
吀�e homogeneity presupposition is one way of validating conditional excluded
middle, which requires that if p, q is false then if p, ¬q is true (see Lewis, 1973,
and Stalnaker, 1973, for discussion).
12) I also adopt the notation byHeim and Kratzer (1998): with λ φ : ψ . χ I mean the function
that maps φ to χ only deﬁned if ψ.
13) See von Fintel (1997) for a discussion of the cases in which contraposition intuitively
should not be validated.
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(45) Conditional ExcludedMiddle: for any f, p, q and w,
¬⟦gen⟧( f)(p)(q)(w) ↔ ⟦gen⟧( f)(p)(¬q)(w)
From here on, I simplify the notation and just write as in (46).
(46) ⟦gen⟧( f)(p)(q)(w) = □[p → q]
吀�e last ingredient thatweneed is ameaning for only. For our purposes the one in
(47)will suﬃce: only takes a set of alternativesC and aproposition p as arguments
and it presupposes the truth of p, while negating all alternatives inC that are not
entailed by it.
(47) ⟦Only⟧(C)(p) = λ w : p(w) . ∀q ∈ C[p ⊈ q → ¬q(w)]
For simplicity’s sake, let us work on the case in which the alternatives in C are
just the following in (48).
(48)
VonFintel (1997) provides some caseswhere focus on the auxiliary or on ifmight
plausibly be interpreted as focus on the truth polarity of the sentence.14
14) Von Fintel (1997) proposes a more general way to handle these cases which works both
with wide and narrow focus in the antecedent. We can straightforwardly adopt it. 吀�e extra
assumption needed is that in the relevant cases one of the alternatives to the antecedent is
true.
(i) Onlyc[(p […]f)(q)]
To give an example, consider the alternatives in (ii).
(ii)
Assuming that in all relevant alternatives one if q one of p, pʹ and pʺ is true, ignoring the
presupposition of the prejacent we have the following derivation.
(iii) a. Onlyc [gen(p)(q)] =
b. ¬□(pʹ → q) ∧ ¬□(pʺ → q) mean of only
c. □[ pʹ → ¬q] ∧ □(pʺ → ¬q) cond excl middle
d. □[q → ¬pʹ] ∧ □[q → ¬pʺ] contrap
e. □[q → p] if q one of p … pn is true
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(49) It probably won’t rain and
a. the game will only be cancelled if it DOES rain.
b. the game will only be cancelled IF it rains.
Given the ingredients above, we can now go through the following derivation:
ﬁrst we compute the meaning of “only,” which presupposes the prejacent and
negates the alternative □ [¬p → q]. Next, we apply conditional excluded middle
and ﬁnally we apply contraposition. 吀�e prediction is that (51-a) now entails
(51-b).
(50) a. Onlyc[genf(p)(q)] =
b. □(p → q) . ¬□(¬p → q) meaning of only
c. □(p → q) . □[¬p → ¬q] cond excl middle
d. □(p → q) . □[q → p] contraposition
(51) a.吀�e ﬂag ﬂies only if the Queen is home.
b. If the ﬂag ﬂies the Queen is home.
吀�e ingredients for solving the presupposition and truth conditions problems
are now in place; let us go back to Soames’ cases and see how we can apply them
there.
4.3. Soames’ Cases Again
4.3.1. First theOnly-IfCase
Consider again the sentence in (52) (= 1) and recall that the assumptions are
Fintel’s (1997) semantics and the A operator.
(52) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
We can now see that the derivation of the meaning of (53-a), with LF in (53-b),
is (54). 吀�e derivation is analogous as above, with the only addition of the A
operator.
(53) a. Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Onlyc[gen[Nixon is guilty] [if A[Haldeman is guilty too]]
(54) Onlyc[gen(
non-matching parenthesis
q, if A(pq)] =
a. □(Apq → q) . ¬□(¬(Apq) → q) meaning of only
b. □(Apq → q) . □[¬(Apq) → ¬q] cond excl middle
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c. □((p ∧ q) → q) . □[¬(p ∧ q) → ¬q] meaning of A15
d. ⊤ . □[¬(p ∧ q) → ¬q] log equiv
e. □[q → (p ∧ q)] contraposition
吀�emeaning predicted for (55-a) is paraphrasable as (55-b) with no presupposi-
tion. I argue that this is the right meaning for the Soames’ case with overt “only.”
(55) a. Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
4.3.2. Now Back to Simple Conditionals
Now, let us go back to simple conditionals like (56) (= 1). It is probably clear
by now that the proposal is that the sentence in (56) is actually interpreted as in
(57).
(56) Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
(57) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
For concreteness, I use an exh operator with a meaning analogous to overt
only (see Fox, 2007; Chierchia et al., to appear). I assume that the tautological
meaning licenses a reinterpretation of the sentence with exh. More precisely,
when a sentence like (57) is uttered in a context we ﬁrst reinterpret it with the
A operator in the antecedent. 吀�e tautological meaning, thereby created, forces
us to a second reinterpretation with the exhaustivity operator.16吀�emeaning of
exh that I assume is in (58).
(58) ⟦exh⟧(Alt(p))(p) = λ w . p(w) ∧ ∀q ∈ Alt(p)[p ⊈ q → ¬q(w)]
吀�eLF for (56) becomes (59) and the derivation in (60) is completely analogous
as the derivation of the case with overt only above. 吀�e only diﬀerence concerns
the fact that the prejacent is now asserted instead of presupposed. Given that it
15) Remember that A(φp) = φ ∧ p.
16) Mandy Simons (p.c.) pointed out tome that exhaustiﬁcation is not a strategy that we seem
to employ in response to other tautological meaning like (i).
(i) War is war.
It’s not clear to me that this is problematic. In fact, we can assume that exhaustiﬁcation can be
used only if there are triggered alternatives in the ﬁrst place and it is not clear that with normal
intonation there are alternatives to (i).
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is tautological anyway, there is no overall diﬀerence in meaning with respect to
the sentence with overt “only”.
(59) exhAlt[gen[Nixon is guilty, if A[Haldeman is guilty too]]]
(60) exh[□(Apq → q)] =
a. □(Apq → q) ∧ ¬□(¬Apq → q) = mean of exh
b. □((q ∧ p) → q) ∧ ¬□(¬(q ∧ p) → q) = meaning of A
c. □((q ∧ p) → q) ∧ □(¬(q ∧ p) → ¬q) = cond excl middle
d. ⊤ ∧ □(¬(q ∧ p) → ¬q) = logical equiv
e. □(q → (q ∧ p)) contraposition
吀�e meaning of (61-a) is predicted to be (61-b), again with no presupposition.
In other words, you would judge (60-a) false if Nixon is guilty but Haldeman
isn’t.
(61) a. Nixon is guilty if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. If Nixon is guilty, both Nixon and Haldeman are guilty.
Notice that this exhaustiﬁcation reinterpretation seems independently moti-
vated by non-presuppositional cases like (62) and (63).17
(62) I will go to the cinema, if you go with me/if we go together.
(63) A:What about John andMary, do you think that they will confess the murder?
B: John will confess, if both of them will.
吀�ese cases are also predicted tobe tautological, unless interpreted as exhaustiﬁed
conditionals, so that the meanings are analogous to (64) and (65).
(64) I will go to the cinema, only if you go with me/only if we go together.
(65) John will confess, only if both of them will.
Summing up, it seems that exhaustiﬁcation (or analogous operations) is needed
independently for treating non presuppositional cases like (62) and (63). 吀�is
same strategy can be used to solve the truth-conditions problem in Soames’
cases.
17) 吀�anks to Philippe Schlenker (pc), Fabio del Prete (pc) and Brian Leahy for discussion on
these cases.
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4.4. A Solution to the Contrast Problem
Recall that Soames (1982) argues that there is a contrast between (66-a) and
(66-b).
(66) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty.
It has been claimed in the literature that whether a conditional clause is in initial
or in ﬁnal position depends on its discourse status as being in the background or
in the foreground (Givon, 1982; von Fintel, 1994).What is relevant for us is the
observation that the sentence-initial position is dispreferred when the if-clause
contains new information. An example that shows this preference is the contrast
in (67-a) and (67-b).
(67) Under what conditions will you buy this house? (von Fintel, 1994)
a. I’ll buy this house if you give me the money.
b. #If you give me the money I’ll buy this house.
exh needs focus on the antecedent to have the alternatives that gives rise to the
exhaustiﬁcation with the meaning of an “only if ” conditional. Assume, further,
a question-answer congruence principle for focus along the lines of (68) (Rooth,
1996) and the notion of Question Under Discussion (QUD) which stands for
the explicit or implicitmain question in the discourse (see Roberts, 2004; Beaver
and Clark, 2009).
(68) 吀�e focus of the answer corresponds to the questioned position in the wh-question.
It follows that the focus in a sentence like (69), in turn, requires a question under
discussion along the lines of (70).18
(69) ?If [Haldeman is guilty too]F, Nixon is guilty
(70) Under what conditions is Nixon guilty?
18) Notice that as a reviewer points out focus is also needed on Haldeman, as that asso-
ciates with too. 吀�e structure is as in (i): the ﬁrst focus on Haldeman associates with too,
while the second focus on the entire antecedent including the A-operator, associates with
exh.
(i) exh[if [A[[Haldeman]F is guilty too]]FNixon is guilty]
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吀�is, however, is precisely the situation that the generalization above says it is
degraded, thus we account for the dispreference for sentence initial conditionals
like (69).19
4.5. Summing Up
I argued that a conditional like (71-a) has the LF in (71-b) and the meaning in
(72).
(71) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. exhAlt[gen[Nixon is guilty, if A[Haldeman is guilty too]]]
(72) If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
I have also argued that the contrast between (73-a) and (73-b) is attributable to
the focus structure of sentence-ﬁnal/initial conditionals.
(73) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty.
吀�e approach here predicts no presupposition problem given the assumption
of local accommodation in the antecedent and no truth-conditions problem,
as the meaning predicted is not tautological. Furthermore, it provides a uniﬁed
account of sentence-ﬁnal conditionals and only if conditionals with a trigger in
the antecedent like (74).
(74) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty.
Finally, it can also account for related non-presuppositional cases like (75).
(75) I’ll go to the cinema, if we go together.
19) It is easy to show thatwithout the alternatives of the antecedentwe donot get themeaning
of “only if ”. Consider a focus structure in which the focus is on “Nixon” in the consequent.
Assuming that we ﬁrst locally merge the A, we can only obtain the negation of alternatives of
the form “x is guilty, if Haldeman and Nixon are guilty”. 吀�e meaning obtained is thus that if
both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty, nobody else relevant is guilty. 吀�ough this might be a
possible reading of the sentence, this is certainly not the primary reading.
(i) [Nixon]F is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too
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5. Open Issues & Extensions
In the following, I discuss four open issues and how to respond to them. First,
I’ve claimed that certain cases of if-conditionals are really interpreted as only
if-conditionals, and one may take issue with that. Second, it has been claimed in
the literature that triggers like too cannot be locally accommodated (Chemla and
Schlenker, to appear), so whywould it be possible here?吀�ird, I have only talked
about too, what about other triggers? Finally, what about other quantiﬁcational
structures, in particular ones for which conditional excluded middle cannot be
assumed? I turn to each of these issues in the next sections.
5.1.Diﬀerences with “Only-If ” and the Pragmatics of exh
5.1.1. Diﬀerences
I have argued that (76-a)means (76-b); in otherwords, it is false ifNixon is guilty
but Haldeman isn’t.
(76) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
To give another example, imagine a context in which we were about to enter the
door of our house and I say (77). 吀�en I open the door and Mark is there but
Bill isn’t. 吀�e question is whether, in that context, I said something false, as the
present proposal predicts.
(77) Mark is here, if Bill is here too.
Instead of relying just on our intuitions about (77), we can ask whether there
are diﬀerences between (78-a) and (78-b), as a contrast would be an argument
against the meaning proposed here.20
(78) a. John will go to the movies, only if Mary goes too.
b. John will go to the movies, if Mary goes too.
吀�ere appear, in fact, to be cases in which (78-a) and (78-b) diﬀer, in particular
when we add a continuation that is incompatible with the only-ifmeaning.21
20) 吀�anks to Brian Leahy, Bernhard Nickel and David Beaver for extremely helpful discus-
sions of the data discussed here.
21) Notice that cases like the above are also possible with non presuppositional cases like (i)
and (ii), so a response is needed independently from Soames’ cases.
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(79) a. Johnwill go to themovies, only ifMary goes too. #But if there is amovie withGeorge
Clooney, he will go whether Mary goes or not.
b. John will go to the movies, if Mary goes too. But if there is a movie with George
Clooney, he will go whether Mary goes or not.
In sum, there seems to be a diﬀerence between Soames’ cases with and without
“only”, which the present proposal does not predict. Notice, however, that the
present proposal is not committed to the claim that a case like (76-a) is always
interpreted as (76-b). 吀�e proposal is that one way to avoid attributing a tauto-
logical meaning to what the speaker said is re-interpreting it exhaustively. It is
compatible with the proposal that the tautological meaning can be also avoided
in other ways in certain cases (cf. fn 24). In the next section, I explore one such
strategy and show that we can, in fact, account for such diﬀerences on pragmatic
grounds.
5.1.2.吀�e Pragmatics of exh
吀�eories of scalar implicatures based on exhaustivity operators of the kind
defended in Chierchia et al. (to appear) and Fox (2007) among others, are pro-
posals that draw the line between semantics and pragmatics diﬀerently than in
Gricean and Neo-Gricean accounts. In particular, Fox (2007) divides the labor
between semantics and pragmatics as follows: scalar implicatures are derived as
entailments of exhaustiﬁed sentences, they are completely on the semantic side,
while ignorance inferences about the speaker are derived pragmatically. More
speciﬁcally, the latter are derived by reasoning about the speaker’s mental state,
as in the (neo)-Gricean accounts, in accordance with a maxim of quantity along
the lines of (80) (adapted from Fox, 2007).
(80) Maxim of Quantity: If S1 and S2 are both relevant to the topic of conversation and S2
is not more informative than S1 , if the speaker believes that both are true, the speaker
should utter S1 rather than S2.
Notice that (80) is not restricted to alternatives allowing us to (only) conclude
that the speaker is ignorant about every relevant proposition that isn’t entailed by
(i) I will go to the cinema, only if we go together. #But if there is a movie with George
Clooney, I’ll go whether you go or not.
(ii) I will go to the cinema, if we go together. But if there is a movie with George Clooney,
I’ll go whether you go or not.
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the assertion.22 By way of illustration consider the sentence in (81-a): (81-a)
can be read with the scalar implicature in (81-b) or with the ignorance infer-
ence in (81-c). 吀�e idea is that the former is derived by exhaustiﬁcation, while
the latter is derived by reasoning in accordance with the maxim of quantity in
(80).23
(81) a. Some student came.
b. Not every student came.
c.吀�e speaker is ignorant as to whether all student came.
In case of a continuation that is incompatible with (81-b) like the one in (82),
an obvious strategy for this approach would be to say that (81-a) is simply inter-
pretedwithout exhaustiﬁcation. Inotherwords, it is readwith theweak inference
in (81-c), which is compatible with the continuation.
(82) Some student came. In fact, maybe even all of them did.
Can we apply the same strategy to the case of (83), repeated from above?
(83) Johnwill go to themovies, ifMary goes too. But if there is amoviewithGeorgeClooney,
he will go whether Mary goes or not.
I propose that we can and that this is precisely what happens in the case of (83):
when we reach the continuation that is incompatible with the exhaustiﬁcation
of the ﬁrst part, we simply re-interpret the ﬁrst sentence without exh. Notice,
though, that in the case of (83), this cannot be the whole story, because if we just
interpret the ﬁrst partwithout exhaustiﬁcation,wewind upwith the tautological
meaning in (84).
(84) John will go to the movies, if Mary and John go.
22) A maxim of quantity non-restricted to alternatives allows us to derive only ignorance
inferences because of the so-called “symmetry problem”. In brief, the problem is that every
time you consider a more informative and relevant proposition p for any asserted proposition
q, also themore informative q ∧¬p, must also be relevant, given reasonable assumptions about
relevance.However, if we assume that the speaker both doesn’t believe p and he doesn’t believe
q ∧ ¬p we obtain that she is ignorant about p (see Fox, 2007, and Chierchia et al., to appear,
for discussion).
23) (81-b) is obtained via assuming the LF in (i-a) and the alternatives in (i).
(i) a. exh[some student came]
b. { some student came, every student came}
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Indeed, I argued above that the tautological meaning is what triggers exhausti-
ﬁcation in a case like (85).Now, however, I amproposing that in the case of a con-
tinuation that is incompatible with this exhaustiﬁcation we do not exhaustify.
吀�e question, hence, is how in these cases we deal with the tautological mean-
ing. I argue that we should look at the pragmatic inferences of (84) obtained
by reasoning in accordance to the maxim of quantity in (80), and that these are
enough to account for the meaning of (83). In particular, the meaning that we
obtain could be paraphrased as (85), which is a coherent and plausible meaning
for (83).
(85) It’s possible that if John goes to the movies, both Mary and John go. But if there is a
movie with George Clooney, he is going whether Mary is going or not.
Let us now go through how we obtain (86): (80) tells us that the speaker is
ignorant about all relevant propositions that are not entailed by the assertion.
We obtain, in particular, that the speaker is ignorant about (86).
(86) John will go to the movies, if not bothMary and John go.
What does it mean that the speaker is ignorant about (86)? It means that we can
conclude (87-a) and (87-b).
(87) a. It’s possible for the speaker that it’s true that if not bothMary and John go, then John
goes.
b. It’s possible for the speaker that it’s false that if not bothMary and John go, then John
goes.
吀�is, in turn, means that, from (87-b), we can go through the derivation in (88),
using conditional excluded middle and contraposition as before, and conclude
(88-d), thus we obtain the meaning in (85), which is not contradictory.24
24) To illustrate that (85) is coherent, we have to ﬁrst look at the interpretation of (88-d).
If the conditional is an epistemic conditional, that is it quantiﬁes over the belief state of the
speaker, I argue that the way we should formalize it is (i): the speaker considers possible that
if John goes, Mary and John go.
(i) ◊[p → q]
吀�is is parallel to the cases in which an overt epistemic possibility modal is present in the
assertion, like in (ii), which is also to be formalized as (i).
(ii) Maybe if John goes, Mary will go.
In the case of a generic conditional like (iii), we would, instead, formalize it as (iv), where ◊
and □ range over diﬀerent modal bases.
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(88) a. It’s possible for the speaker that it’s false that if not bothMary and John go, then John
goes.
b. It’s possible for the speaker if not both John and
Mary go, John doesn’t go conditional excluded middle
c. It’s possible for the speaker that if John goes, Mary and John go. contraposition
d. It’s possible for the speaker that if John goes, Mary goes. log equiv
In sum, I argue that a sentence like (89) can have the strong reading in (90-a),
obtained via the insertion of exh, or theweak reading in (90-b), in turn obtained
via pragmatic reasoning in accordance with (80). 吀�e latter reading is used, in
particular, when the ﬁrst one is incompatible with either a continuation of the
sentence or information in the context.
(89) John goes, if Mary goes too.
(90) a. If John goes, Mary goes.
b. It’s possible that if John goes, Mary goes.
(iii) Maybe the kids play soccer, if the sun is shining.
(iv) ◊□[p → q]
We also have to look at the contribution of the unconditional whether or not in the continua-
tion. For our purposes, I simply assume that whether or not-p, q should be formalized as (v-a).
(v-a) is equivalent to (v-b), but given the compatibility presupposition it also requires that in
the domain of quantiﬁcation there is a world in which p and a world in which ¬p (see Rawlins,
2008, for a more sophisticated analysis of unconditional, which is, however, compatible with
the present proposal).
(v) a. □[p → q] ∧ □[¬p → q]
b. □ q
Putting these two things together, I propose that the way to formalize (vi) is (vii-a), which is
coherent and equivalent to (vi-b), with the presupposition that there is a world in the modal
base in which there is a movie with George Clooney andMary goes and one in which there is
a movie with George Clooney andMary doesn’t go.
(vi) It’s possible that if John goes, Mary goes. But if there is a movie with George Clooney,
John goes whether or not Mary goes.
(vii) a. ◊[p → q] ∧ □[(r ∧ ¬q) → p] ∧ □[(r ∧ q) → p]
b. ◊[p → q] ∧ □[r → p]
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In the case of overt “only” repeated in (91), on the other hand, of course there
is no option of interpreting the sentence without “only”, thus contradiction is
bound to arise.25,26
25) To illustrate, we formalize the meaning of (91) as (i-a). 吀�is is equivalent to (i-b) but it
introduces the compatibility presuppositions that there is a world in which r and ¬q (cf. fn.
23). Given the second conjunct, however, that worldmust also be a p-world, whichmeans that
this world falsify the ﬁrst conjunct, as it is a world in which p and ¬q.
(i) a. □[p → q] ∧ □[(r ∧ ¬q) → p] ∧ □[(r ∧ q) → p]
b. □[p → q] ∧ □[r → p]
26) An anonymous reviewer points out that a sentence like (i) is felicitous and asks whether
this is not a problem for the present approach.
(i) I’ll go, whether you go too or not.
Let me show that (i) is not a problem: I analyze (i) to as (ii-a), which is equivalent to (ii-b),
but that also introduces the compatibility presuppositions that in the modal base there is at
least a world p ∧ q and a world p ∧ ¬q (cf. fn. 23)
(ii) a. □[(p ∧ q) → p] ∧ □[¬(p ∧ q) → p]
b. □ p
(i) is, hence, not tautological and justmeans that I will go, while presupposing that it’s possible
that you come and that you don’t come. In other words, in this case we do not need to
exhaustify to obtain a tautological meaning a昀�er local accommodation.
吀�is strategy helps also with another question of the same reviewer about cases like (iii).
(iii) Nixon is guilty, even if Haldeman is guilty too.
An indicative even-if conditional like (iii) appears to have a whether or not interpretation. In
other words, it appears to entail the consequent (Barker, 1994). I submit that the meaning
we want to obtain for (iii) is that Nixon is guilty and that it’s possible that both Haldeman is
guilty and that it’s possible thatHaldeman isn’t guilty. Assuming a simpliﬁed version of even-if
conditionals, which says roughly that p, even if q means that p, if q and p, if not-q, we would
predict that (iii) is not tautological and means (iv-a), which is equivalent to (iv-b), and that
presupposes (iv-c) and (iv-d) (seeBarker, 1994, for discussion and amore sophisticated version
of this analysis).
(iv) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman and Nixon are guilty and Nixon is guilty if not both
Haldeman and Nixon are guilty
b. Nixon is guilty
c. it’s possible that Nixon and Haldeman are guilty
d. it’s possible that not both Nixon and Haldeman are guilty
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(91) John will go, only if Mary goes too. #But if there is a movie with George Clooney, he
will go, whether or not Mary goes.
In sum, we can account for certain diﬀerences between Soames’ cases with and
without overt “only”, if we look at their pragmatic inferences.
5.2. Too and Accommodation
5.2.1. Is Local Accommodation Possible or Not?
It is claimed in the literature that triggers like too are very hard, if not impossible,
to locally accommodate.27Chemla and Schlenker (to appear) discuss the case in
(92).
(92) #I talked to Ann. It’s impossible that John too will come. Ann is abroad.
吀�e question is why (92-b)
correct?
cannot mean that it is impossible that both John and
Ann will come because Ann is abroad. 吀�is would be exactly the meaning that
we would obtain if we could locally merge the A operator.
(93) It’s impossible [A[that John too will come]]. = It’s impossible that [Ann will come and
John will come]. Ann is abroad.
More to the point, why can’t we insert an A locally in (92-b) and we can in
Soames’ cases? Chemla and Schlenker (to appear) propose a semantics for too
based on contrastive focus. As I discuss in the next section, their analysis can
Putting it all together, the meaning we obtain is that Nixon is guilty and that it’s possible that
Haldeman is guilty and that it’s possible that he isn’t, which is precisely the meaning that
we wanted to obtain above. Notice that, as in the case of whether or not, we do not need to
exhaustify. 吀�is fact also accounts for the observation that overt “only” cannot occur with
“even” in cases like (v) and with whether or not as in (vi).
(v) Nixon is guilty, (*only) even (*only) if Haldeman is guilty too.
(vi) Nixon is guilty, (*only) whether (*only) Haldeman is guilty too or not.
27) Triggers like too are also assumed to be impossible to accommodate globally.Kripke (2009)
shows that an example like (i) is infelicitous in a context in which there is no salient individual
that satisﬁes the predicate.
(i) ??Sam is having dinner in New York tonight, too.
In response to this data, it has been claimed that too has an anaphoric component that needs a
salient entity in the context (Heim, 1992; Kripke, 2009). 吀�e lack of global accommodation
can be traced back to the absence of a salient anaphoric reference. Notice that in Chemla and
Schlenker’s (to appear) case the ﬁrst sentence provides a salient entity in the context.
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account for why it is not possible to locally accommodate in their case above and
it is possible instead in cases like Soames’.28
5.2.2. A Semantics for Too
Chemla and Schlenker’s (to appear) analysis of too has the following characteris-
tics: (i) too is a focus sensitive particle that requires a clausal antecedent (ii) the
clausal antecedent has to be presupposed to be true (iii) the clausal antecedent
has to entail a member of the focus value of the clause containing too. For illus-
tration consider a case like (94), adapted from Rooth (1992): the requirement
is that a member of the focus value of [HE insulted HER] is entailed by the
antecedent clause [Mary insulted John] (the antecedent of too will be indicated
with co-indexation).29
(94) [Mary insulted John]i, and then HE insulted HER tooi.
吀�e case in (94) is straightforward; consider now a slightly more sophisticated
case like (95). (95) is felicitous as long as we globally accommodate that if Mary
called John a republican, she insulted her.
(95) [Mary called John a republican]i, and then HE insulted HER tooi.
吀�is is derived by Chemla and Schlenker’s (to appear) analysis. In fact, the
requirement is that the antecedent entails a member of the focus alternatives of
the clause [HE insultedHER].吀�e alternatives are of the form x insulted y, where
for (95) x and y are resolved to Mary and John, respectively. 吀�en, [Mary called
John a republican] entails that [Mary insulted John] if we accommodate that if
Mary called John a republican, then she insulted him.
28) Notice that, as they discuss, this runs against their own assumption that too is impossible
to locally accommodate. 吀�anks to Philippe Schlenker (p.c.) for pointing this to me and for
extensive and extremely helpful discussion on this part of the paper.
29) More formally, the analysis of too is the following in (i) (where ⟦⟧f and ⟦⟧o are the focus
and ordinary value, respectively, see Rooth (1992))
(i) ⟦tooi IP⟧g,wo = # unless
a. g( i) denotes a proposition that is true at w
b. for some proposition p in ⟦IP⟧g,wf
1) p is an alternative distinct from ⟦IP⟧g,wo
2) relative to the context set, g( i) entails p
if ⟦tooi IP⟧g,w is deﬁned than it is equal to ⟦IP⟧g,w
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Notice that allowing global accommodation of conditionals like the above,
wouldmassively overgenerate. In fact, it is in principle possible with any anteced-
ent, unless some economy condition is postulated. Chemla and Schlenker (to
appear) propose the constraint in (96).
(96) Role of the antecedent.吀�e antecedent clause of too plays a role in satisfying the presup-
position it triggers. More precisely, the presupposition which is accommodated when i
denotes this antecedent should not be equivalent to the presupposition that would have
to be accommodated in its absence, i.e. if i denoted the context set.
Chemla and Schlenker (to appear: 14)
To illustrate the role of (96), they discuss the contrast between (97) and (98).
(97) [Mary is eating popovers]i, and John tooi is overeating.
(98) [Mary is drinking Bordeaux]i, and John tooi is overeating.
In both (98) and (97) the clausal antecedent entails the clause containing too
if we accommodate the conditionals if Mary is eating popovers, she is overeat-
ing and if Mary is drinking Bordeaux, she is overeating. 吀�e former case, how-
ever, appears unproblematic, while the latter is quite hard in absence of further
information in the context. 吀�eir intuition is that if one is willing to accommo-
date (98), then this is probably because one already believes the consequent, i.e.
that Mary is overeating. But if this is the case, then the antecedent plays no role
in the satisfaction of the presupposition and this is precisely what (96) disal-
lows.
5.2.3. Back to Local Accommodation
Contrary to Chemla and Schlenker (to appear) I am assuming that local accom-
modation is possible with too.30 吀�e idea is that once we adopt their analysis of
too and the economy condition in (96), we can account for the infelicity of (92)
as a violation of (96), without assuming that it is due to an impossibility of local
30) As Chemla and Schlenker (to appear) discuss a resulting prediction is that sentences like
(i) and (ii) should be felicitous. In my intuitions, (i) is felicitous, while (ii) is more degraded.
I leave this as an open problem here.
(i) Johnwonders whetherMary will come to the party. But it’s clear that if Peter comes too,
the evening will be highly entertaining.
(ii) ?John doubts that Mary will come to the party. But it’s clear that if Peter comes too, the
evening will be highly entertaining.
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accommodation. In fact, too needs a clausal antecedent and this forces global
accommodation of the conditional if I talked to Ann, she is coming to the party
and onewould do this presumably only if one already believes thatAnn is coming
to the party. However, this leads to a violation of (96).
Soames’ cases, on the other hand, are such that the consequent can be the
anaphoric antecedent for too, so no such problem arise andwe can locally accom-
modate.31
(99) [Haldeman is guilty]i, if Nixon is guilty tooi
5.3.Other Triggers
We saw that triggers like too can give rise to Soames’ cases. also can be used to
create analogous cases.
(100)Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is also guilty.
Wemight be able to create these cases with again, as in (101-a).
(101)Suppose we are at the beginning of the season, Shaq has just came to Boston and we are
at the second game
31) Onemight askwhywe cannot globally accommodate in Soames’ cases. I believe this relates
to the generalization in (i) proposed by Katzir and Singh (to appear) (see also Gazdar, 1979).
(i) Ignorance Inferences Block Accommodation: Accommodation of a proposition p is
disallowed if doing so would contradict an earlier ignorance inference that the speaker
is ignorant about p. (Katzir and Singh, to appear)
Katzir and Singh (to appear) provide examples like (ii) in support of (i).
(ii) If Lyle ﬂies to Toronto, he has a sister. #His sister is fromMontréal.
吀�e proposition that Lyle has a sister is the consequent of the conditional thus the speaker
implies that she is ignorant about it (Gazdar, 1979). 吀�e idea is that the speaker cannot
go on and require the hearer to accommodate the same information that she implied to be
ignorant about. Soames’ cases provide a similar situation: we have a proposition that is both
the presupposition to be accommodated and the consequent of the conditional.
(iii) p, if φp
What we would get if we were to globally accommodate would simply equivalent to p.
(iv) A(p, if φp) = p ∧ (p, if φp)
However, the speaker has just implied that she is ignorant about p, so there is a clash and p
cannot be globally accommodated.
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a. I don’t know if Shaq played yesterday, but
(?)He played yesterday, if he plays again today.
However other triggers appear to be non felicitous in this conﬁguration.
(102)?Mary used to smoke, if she stopped.
(103)?Mary is in New York, if John discovered that she is there.
(104)?Somebody killed Mary, if it was the butler.
吀�is might suggest that we are dealing with a speciﬁc phenomenon linked to
additives. Notice, though, that in those cases the correspondent overt only if
conditionals are also infelicitous.
(105)?Mary used to smoke, only if she stopped.
(106)?Mary is in New York, only if John discovered that she is there.
(107)?Somebody killed Mary, only if it was the butler.
吀�ere seems to be some yet to be explained factor that makes also overt only if
weird in these conﬁgurations. In these cases we have a tautological meaning that
triggers exhaustiﬁcation, however, the sentences remain weird as the overt only
examples show.吀�e present proposal predicts that to the extent that one can cre-
ate a context in which the sentence with only if is felicitous, so will be the sen-
tence ﬁnal conditional without only. If the weirdness is both with conditionals
and only-if conditionals, those cases might not tell us much about the Soames’
problem.
5.4.Quantiﬁcational Cases
Given the treatment above, we expect to ﬁnd analogous cases with generic and
quantiﬁed sentences.
5.4.1. Generics
In the case of generics, we can straightforwardly adopt Fintel’s (1997) proposal,
which extend to only in generics.吀�e onlymodiﬁcation is generalizing themean-
ing of gen so that it can quantify over predicates.
(108) a. Only professors are conﬁdent.
b. Onlyc[gen[professors] [are conﬁdent ] ]
c. All conﬁdent people are professors.
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吀�e question is whether we can create cases analogous to Soames’ ones with
generics or habituals. I argue that we can: although in English these cases sound
a bit funny, in Italian, where subjects can appear easily post-verbally, these exam-
ples sound natural.
(109) a. (?) Only professors that are also conﬁdent are tall.
b. (?) Professors that are also tall are conﬁdent.
(110)Sono bravi i professori che sono anche ben vestiti.
are good the professors that are also well dressed
吀�e problem is the same, the meaning predicted for (110) is tautological, some-
thingwe can paraphrase as (111). If we apply Fintel’s (1997) semantics we obtain
the non-tautological meaning in (112).
(111)Professors that are well-dressed and good are good.
(112)Professors that are good are good and well-dressed.
Summing up, the proposal here can be extended straightforwardly to cases of
generics that are analogous to Soames’ cases.
5.4.2. Overt Quantiﬁers
吀�e case of overt quantiﬁers is more complicated. Consider (113), with focus on
the entire restriction.
(113)Yesterday, I met every [student that you also met]f
吀�e problem is that here we do not have conditional excluded middle. In fact, if
(114-a) is true it certainly does not follow that (114-b) also is.
(114) a. Not every student came
b. Every student didn’t come
If we apply the strategy above without the homogeneity presupposition, we get
a very weak meaning: “there is somebody in the domain of quantiﬁcation that I
didn’t meet yesterday.”
(115) a. Yesterday, I met every [student that you also met]f
b. exh[everyx(QxPx)(Px)]
c. ¬(∀x[¬( s(x) ∧m(I, x) ∧m(y, x)) →m(I, x)])
d. ∃x[¬( s(x) ∧m(I, x) ∧m(y, x)) ∧ ¬m(I, x)]
e. ∃x[¬m(I, x)]
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Notice, however, that this is a problem also for cases with overt “only”, so we
need an independent solution for that as well. For cases in which the focus is
on the entire restrictor, von Fintel (1997: 43) proposes a solution expanding the
domain of alternatives; a solution that we can adopt here.
(116)Yesterday, I only met every [student that you also met]f
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